The key change is reflected in the new wording of Section 858 of the Civil Code, which systematically defines the content of parental responsibility. It now explicitly includes care of the child (including care for his or her health and physical, emotional, intellectual, and moral development without corporal punishment, mental suffering, or other humiliating measures), the protection of the child, maintaining contact with the child, ensuring upbringing and education, determining the place of residence, representing the child, and administering his or her property. This leads to a clear expression of all the basic components of parental responsibility directly in the text of the law. The law thus clearly differentiates the personal component, the proprietary component, and the representation of the child, which allows for more precise and proportionate court interventions while simultaneously increasing the legal certainty of the parties to the proceedings.

The explicit enshrinement of the ban on corporal punishment represents an important value shift. The law thus unequivocally confirms that the care of the child must take place without physical punishments or any humiliating or psychologically distressing measures. This principle is now directly part of the statutory definition of parental responsibility, not merely an interpretation, and is also significant for assessing the proportionality of the exercise of parental rights and obligations.

An essential change is also the new concept of contact. Existing practice often created a dichotomy between “the caregiving parent” and “the parent with the right to contact,” which led to a de facto unequal status of parents and sometimes even to a weakening of the parental role of the other parent. The amendment abandons this perspective. Contact is now explicitly understood as part of the care of the child. The term “contact” includes not only personal (direct) contact, but also indirect contact via means of remote communication, as well as mutual provision of essential information between the parents and the child. The care of the child is thus understood in a broader sense and includes each parent’s personal contact with the child. Both parents bear responsibility for the child’s health and development regardless of how the exercise of care is concretely arranged.

This is related to another important principle, according to which care by only one parent is not excluded, but can no longer be separated from a formal interference with parental responsibility. The explanatory report explicitly states that, without a link to the suspension, restriction, or deprivation of parental responsibility, it should no longer be possible to decide on care by only one parent (and contact with the other parent), or on the restriction or prohibition of contact. In other words, if a particular component of parental responsibility is to be effectively restricted, there must be a corresponding court decision on the interference with parental responsibility as such, thereby increasing the transparency of interferences with parents’ rights and strengthening their procedural protection.

The amendment also explicitly enshrines the right to indirect contact and the right to information about the child for the period during which the other parent is caring for the child. If no agreement is reached, the court may regulate indirect contact and its conditions, including setting specific communication rules. The caregiving parent is obliged to support indirect contact and to refrain from anything that would undermine it.

The strengthening of the equality of parents is also significantly reflected in Section 888 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, according to which the child has the right to equal care by both parents, and the parents have the right to equal care of their child. This does not introduce an automatic “50/50” model, but rather a value framework that is meant to support the greatest possible involvement of both parents in the child’s life and which should apply even without the involvement of the court. The court must not proceed from a general rule and look for exceptions, but rather individually assess the best interests of the particular child in his or her specific life circumstances. After all, the amendment explicitly abandons the demonstrative list of criteria and emphasizes the individualization of decision-making and the court’s responsibility to properly justify why a particular arrangement is in the best interests of the child.

Another significant innovation is the new factual basis for the suspension of the exercise of parental responsibility under Section 869 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. The court may suspend the exercise of parental responsibility if, as a result of its exercise, there is a risk of endangering the child’s emotional or psychological development and this risk cannot be prevented otherwise. This provision also targets situations where the child refuses contact with a parent. However, it cannot be inferred from the provision that expressing disagreement alone automatically gives the child the right to refuse contact with the parent. The child’s opinion must be taken seriously, examining the reasons behind it, and assessing it in light of the child’s age and psychological maturity. The fact that a child is able to articulate his or her stance comprehensibly does not yet mean that the child is able to fully understand its long-term consequences. Case law has long emphasized the need for professional assistance, the use of specialized facilities, and educational measures. Only if these measures fail and the refusal is permanent can a procedure under Section 869 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code be considered, always as a last resort and to the necessary extent, for example by maintaining at least indirect contact or the right to information.

The regulation also strengthens the support of the parental role of the other parent. Parents who do not live together must refrain from anything that disrupts the child’s relationship with the other parent or makes his or her upbringing more difficult. Unjustified and repeated obstruction of the other parent’s care is grounds for a new court decision on the arrangement of the child’s circumstances.

The change in concept also affects the status of the spouse, partner, or cohabitant of the parent. A person living in a common household with a parent can also participate in the care and upbringing. The previous practice, in which the partner of one of the parents was effectively pushed out of care on the grounds that it was merely the exercise of the right to contact, should be overcome. At the same time, the rule remains that personal contact cannot be entrusted to another person; however, this provision must be understood as protection of the parent’s personal contact with the child, not as a prohibition on obtaining ordinary assistance in care.

The new wording of Section 907 of the Civil Code introduces a more flexible model of decision-making on care. If the parents agree that the child remains in the care of both parents without specifying a particular scope, the court will decide accordingly; however, the question of maintenance must also be resolved. If the agreement is not comprehensive, it is not possible to proceed under this provision. If the court decides under Section 907 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, it will determine the scope of each parent’s care individually based on the best interests of the child and always decide on the maintenance obligation as well.

If a situation arises in which care by both parents is not possible—for reasons on the part of the parent or, exceptionally, on the part of the child—the court must simultaneously address an interference with parental responsibility. The law does not allow a parent to voluntarily renounce parental responsibility. If the parent does not show any interest in the child or refuses care without a relevant reason, a restriction of parental responsibility according to Section 870 of the Civil Code may be considered. Parental responsibility represents a set of both rights and obligations; it cannot be approached selectively.

The amendment explicitly declares the possibility of changing the arrangement of circumstances by agreement of the parents even if the initial arrangement was decided by a judgment. The court should take such an agreement into account when making further decisions. The new regulation applies to all proceedings ongoing from January 1, 2026, including already initiated proceedings. The existing decisions on care remain in force, and they can only be changed if there is a change of circumstances.

In the end, the amendment represents a shift from the formalistic distinction of roles to a value-based principle of the equality of parents and the consistent protection of the best interests of the child. It brings greater transparency in interferences with parental responsibility, emphasizes the duty to cooperate and support the parental role of the other parent, and at the same time gives the court tools to address situations where the exercise of parental responsibility endangers the psychological development of the child. In my view, the amendment significantly strengthens the balance between the rights and obligations of parents and supports their genuine and active involvement in the care of the child, while also placing greater emphasis on identifying and fulfilling the real needs of the child and on sensitive work with his or her opinion in light of the child’s age and capacity to understand the situation. In practice, this means increased demands for the individualization of decision-making, comprehensive work with the child’s opinion, and a holistic approach to family relationships, which allows courts to better protect the rights of the child and the parents while also supporting functional family relationships.

Source: epravo.cz